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Abstract Evaluation of quality of life, psychic and bodily well-being is becoming
increasingly important in oncology aftercare. This type of assessment is mainly
carried out by medical psychologists. In this paper I will seek to show that body
experience valuation has, besides its psychological usefulness, a normative and
practical dimension. Body experience evaluation aims at establishing the way a
person experiences and appreciates his or her physical appearance, intactness and
competence. This valuation constitutes one’s ‘body image’. While, ﬁrst, interpreting
the meaning of body image and, second, indicating the limitations of current psy-
chological body image assessment, I argue that the normative aspect of body image
is related to the experience of bodily wholeness or bodily integrity. Since this
experience is contextualized by a person’s life story, evaluation should also focus on
narrative aspects. I ﬁnally suggest that the interpretation of body experience is not
only valuable to assess a person’s quality of life after treatment, but that it can also
be useful in counseling prior to interventions, since it can support patients in making
decisions about interventions that will change their bodies. To apply this type of
evaluation to oncology practice, a rich and tailored vocabulary of body experiences
has to be developed.
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As a result of the rapid development of effective treatments (e.g. ‘targeted therapy’),
the chances of survival for various forms of cancer have increased considerably in
the last decade [60]. Given that the disease is now often treatable and has become
comparatively manageable, it is no longer considered a ‘medical emergency’ but
instead a ‘chronic condition’ [33]. This change allows new perspectives and focus in
treatments. Although oncologic safety, obviously, remains the primary focus, more
and more attention is paid to quality of life related issues in the treatment and
nursing care of cancer patients.
Besides a permanent (latent) fear of relapses, cancer survivors often have to deal
with physical defects, as is very clear in cases of breast cancer and head and neck
cancer. These may result in functional disturbances such as problems with speaking
and swallowing (in the case of head and neck cancer) or limited motility of the
upper limb (in the case of breast cancer) which, evidently, can be important for a
person’s quality of life. In addition to this, however, are the changes in appearance
often brought about by these physical blemishes. These changes in appearance,
which cannot simply be reduced to physical function or dysfunction, may affect a
person’s valuation of his or her body and thus change a person’s ‘body image’. It is
now generally assumed that body image related issues are essential to a person’s
quality of life [27, 41].
1
In contemporary (psycho-)oncology attention to body image issues is increasing
[1, 8, 14, 16, 63, 64]. In the last decade speciﬁc body image self-report scales have
been developed [3, 4, 7, 27]. These questionnaires are mainly used to evaluate
treatment in clinical trials and sometimes to support psychotherapeutic
interventions.
2
In the context of the increasing interest for body image related issues in
oncology, I would like to suggest that body experience evaluation is valuable not
only from a psychological perspective. My hypothesis is that body experience
evaluation can play an important role in health care practices, especially in these
kinds of practices where patients have to decide (together with the medical
professionals involved) about interventions which will affect their physical
appearance. In this paper, I would like to make visible the practical and ethical
dimension of body experience evaluation in oncology, mainly concentrating on
breast cancer. I will do so by means of a conceptual and phenomenological analysis
of body image and bodily integrity. This paper thus also amounts to a medico-
ethical analysis from a phenomenological perspective which, as has been rehearsed
1 Van der Steeg [59], by contrast, claims that the importance of ‘body image’ is overestimated with
respect to quality of life in breast cancer patients. This claim, however, is based upon an inadequate
conception of ‘body image’. Her study starts from the assumption that body image is the same as physical
appearance. As I will explain, body image implies a relation to one’s physical self.
2 Medical psychologists have established that body image disturbances are often associated with speciﬁc
psychic problems such as poor self-esteem [34], social anxiety [10] and depressive symptoms [54].
Cancer survivors often suffer from these kinds of psychic troubles. Cognitive and behavioral therapy,
aiming at the reinforcement of one’s body image, therefore supports the general condition of one’s
psychic well-being [63].
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health care analysis as well as in medical ethics.
My analysis involves the following steps. First, I will brieﬂy explain the meaning
of what is called ‘body image’, drawing on philosophical and psychological
literature.
3 Second, I will discuss how body image is currently evaluated in breast
cancer patients. I will do so by focusing on the way questions are phrased on the
Body Image Scale (BIS) questionnaire and pointing to its inherent limitations.
Third, I will introduce the notions of ‘bodily integrity’ and ‘identiﬁcation’ and will
explain how these may be useful for understanding the impact of body experience
evaluation in health care practice. In the ﬁnal section, I will argue in favor of the
application of body experience evaluation in counseling prior to (surgical)
interventions in oncology.
‘Body Image’: Being Related to One’s Physical Self
Since the 1990s, body image research has increased enormously within (clinical)
psychology and psychiatry [40]. Having its origin in psychological, neurological,
psycho-analytic, and phenomenological-existential studies of the way in which
people experience their own body [20, 36, 45, 47], the concept ‘body image’ is far
from univocal. Very often the term body image is associated with the simple idea of
‘how the body looks like’. Psychologists, on the other hand, claim that it is a
complex term which refers to the ‘multifaceted experience of embodiment’ [9].
Although my primary interest in this paper concerns the usage of body image in
(medical) psychology, for the sake of clarity, I will ﬁrst brieﬂy rehearse some
conceptual distinctions made in contemporary philosophy. From a philosophical
perspective, body image refers to a certain form and level of consciousness, i.e. the
way one’s own body is an ‘object’ of one’s consciousness. Gallagher [23] deﬁnes
‘body image’ as a ‘‘system of perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs pertaining to one’s
own body’’ (p. 24). This system requires a certain degree of consciousness, albeit
often implicit or pre-reﬂective. Indeed, very often I am not fully aware of how I
perceive my own body. This more or less conscious system should be distinguished
from ‘body schema’ which, according to Gallagher, refers to ‘‘a system of sensory-
motor capacities that function without awareness or the necessity of perceptual
monitoring’’ (p. 24). One’s ‘body schema’ is thus not part of one’s consciousness.
The body schema operates in a close-to-automatic way, e.g. if I reach out for a glass,
my hand shapes itself for picking up the glass [23]. This intentional action is,
therefore, not a reﬂective or conscious action. Obviously, it is possible to
perceptually monitor this action. Then, the hand in movement becomes part of the
body image. The distinction between body image and body schema is helpful in
specifying (pre)conscious and unconscious aspects in the experience of one’s own
3 It is not my intention to provide a literature review here. While summarizing the essential features of
what is meant by body image, my explanation rather aims at providing some clarity in the hotchpotch of
current body image literature.
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integrated system.
4
The philosophical interest in the notion of body image is particularly related to
questions of consciousness or, more speciﬁcally, the relation between unconscious
processes and (pre) conscious experiences. Medical psychology does not concern
itself with these kinds of (epistemological) questions. It is primarily interested in
dimensions of (bodily) experience, leaving to one side questions concerning the
degree of consciousness involved in these experiences. Medical psychologists that
test body image, using standard questionnaires, presuppose that body image
involves a totally conscious experience of one’s own body. Indeed, self-report
scales presuppose that participants are aware of what is being tested [23]. Compared
to its use in philosophical discussion, the concept of body image in psychology has
thus been narrowed down to a simple conscious experience of one’s body. Also,
because of its focus on body experience and behavior, and less attention on
underlying sensory-motor capacities, psychology deals exclusively with ‘body
image’, leaving aside the ‘body schema’ system. In the psychological practice of
clinical trials, this narrow concept of ‘body image’ is considered to be sufﬁcient
when testing bodily experience after medical interventions. In the last section of this
paper, however, where I return to the phenomenon of the body image’s
preconscious edges, I will maintain that medical practice will beneﬁt from a
broader concept of body image. As I see it, it is by means of a narrative approach—
which allows a ‘‘quest’’ for giving voice to both explicit and implicit bodily
experiences—instead of a pure cognitive-psychological one, that professionals are
able to articulate and interpret one’s body image, including its less conscious
dimensions and its temporal course.
Before criticizing contemporary psychological usage of body image, I will ﬁrst
explain and summarize it: ‘body image’ involves a conscious experience of one’s
own body, which, nevertheless, does not simply refer to one’s physical body. It
rather involves a certain relation to one’s physical self. In what follows, I will
specify the meaning of both (1) ‘physical self’ and (2) ‘relation’.
(1) In psychological literature, ‘‘physical self’’ refers to one’s appearance, one’s
physical competence, and one’s physical intactness. This seems to be a rather
straightforward deﬁnition, yet it includes different aspects of embodiment:
whereas appearance has to do with one’s own body as a certain object of
perception, competence is directly related to motor intentionality and capacity
and thus involves one’s body as an agent. The notion of physical intactness can
refer to both biological and functional intactness of one’s body, and can thus
include one’s body as both object and agent. As I will discuss in the remainder
of this paper, it is with regard to the idea of physical intactness in particular
that confusion can arise. Psychologists, exploring quality of life and body
4 Gallagher [23] notes, however, that speciﬁc neurological disorders can disintegrate the relation between
body image and body schema. For instance, he describes the case of IW, a male adult who lost his sense
of prorioception and touch below the neck due to an infectious mononucleosis. IW does not experience
his own body from within. In fact, he has lost his body schema and compensates for this loss by means of
his body image, which means that he has to consciously monitor all his movements.
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body’s functional or biological intactness. (Cf. [16]). In so doing, they, perhaps
unwittingly, follow the biomedical discourse which makes no distinction
between physical intactness and ‘bodily integrity’. I ﬁnd this usage of the term
bodily integrity inadequate. In my view, bodily integrity involves more than
biological and functional intactness. Like body image, bodily integrity implies
a relation to one’s physical body (which I will explain as a relation through
identiﬁcation). If one omits the relational aspect in body integrity one
overlooks its normative dimension.
(2) According to psychological literature, the relation to one’s physical self in
body image can be (a) perceptual or (b) attitudinal.
(a) Theperceptualcomponentofbodyimagerefers toawarenessofone’sown
body. This aspect is often associated with the representations of somatic
sensations in one’s brain, which has indeed resulted in a more neuro-
scientiﬁc connotation of ‘body image’ [29]. At a psychological level, the
perceptual aspect refers to the ability to evaluate accurately the size, shape
and position of one’s body. Thus examination of eating disorders such as
anorexiasometimesinvolvesassessmentoftheperceptualbodyimage[38,
55]. Explicit disturbances of the perceptual body image include the
experience of a phantom limb [42, 45] or experimentally evoked illusory
experiencessuchastheRubberHandIllusion[6,49].Althoughsome(rare)
cases of phantom breast sensations after mastectomy have been reported
[53],theassessmentofperceptualcomponentsisnotacentralissueinbody
image research in cancer survivors. It rather focuses on the attitudinal
aspects involved in the phenomenon of body image.
(b) Theattitudinalrelationtoone’sphysicalselfcanimplycognitive,affective
and behavioral components. Cognitive aspects include thoughts, percep-
tions and beliefs about one’s body. The affective component refers to the
way one feels about one’s body (ashamed, embarrassed, disappointed,
satisﬁed, proud, etc.). The valuation of one’s own body can also be related
to typical behavior, such as avoiding certain situations. Although these
three components are related to one another, there can be a dissonance
between them. People with negative thoughts (cognitive) and feelings
(affective) about their body, for instance, do not necessarily avoid mirrors.
Body image disturbances in cancer survivors are predominantly caused by actual
changes in appearance, though it should be noted that the actual diagnosis ‘cancer’,
and even the mere knowledge that one is the carrier of a gene mutation which
increases the risk of breast cancer, may affect one’s thoughts and feelings about
one’s body [18]. In what follows, I will concentrate on the impact (expected)
physical damage can have on the way one experiences one’s own body, and will
limit myself to cases of disﬁguring breast cancer.
5
5 It should be noted that not all bodily feelings and experiences can be related to one’s body image.
Feelings like nausea, fatigue and fear of death, which occur frequently in cancer survivors, refer to the
experience of one’s body ‘beyond image’ [11].
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The European Organization for Research and Treatment of Cancer (EORTC) Quality
of Life study group takes responsibility for the development and validation of
speciﬁc QoL self-report scales for various cancers. Next to the QoL-Breast cancer
questionnaire (EORTC-QLQ-BR23), it has developed a body image scale for
(breast) cancer patients (BIS) [27]. Apart from literature review and discussions with
health care professionals, this 10-item scale is, based upon extensive interviews (and
subsequent debrieﬁng interviews) with breast cancer patients. It is designed to
provide a quick impression of the intensity of a patient’s distress: ranging from 0 to
30, with 0 representing no distress and higher scores representing increasing distress.
It has often been claimed that quantitative evaluations of patients’ experiences
are incomplete (Cf. [13, 21]). Although I share the view that quantitative tools might
be limited, I have no intention to criticize quantitative research as such. The
question whether experience in itself is quantiﬁable or not is not my concern here. I
would rather point to some (perhaps unavoidable) problems in phrasing. For this
purpose, I reproduce the BIS here and, subsequently, I will single out some issues
concerning language to judge its adequacy.
BIS: In this questionnaire you will be asked how you feel about your
appearance, and about changes that may have resulted from your disease or
treatment. Please read each item carefully, and place a ﬁrm tick on the line
alongside the reply which comes closest to the way you have been feeling
about yourself, during the past week.
1. Have you been feeling self-conscious about your appearance?
2. Have you felt less attractive as result of your disease or treatment?
3. Have you been dissatisﬁed with your appearance when dressed?
4. Have you been feeling less feminine/masculine as a result of your disease or
treatment?
6
5. Did you ﬁnd it difﬁcult to look at yourself naked?
6. Have you been feeling less sexually attractive as a result of your disease or
treatment?
7. Did you avoid people because of the way you felt about your body?
8. Have you been feeling the treatment has left your body less whole?
9. Have you felt dissatisﬁed with your body?
10. Have you been dissatisﬁed with the appearance of your scar?.
Reply ratings:
Not at all (score 0)
A little (score 1)
Quite a bit (score 2)
Very much (score 3)
Hopwood et al. [27]
6 This BIS is designed to be used with any group of cancer survivors. But it should be noted that it was
developed on the basis of interviews with female breast cancer survivors only. Also, its French version is
used exclusively for the assessment of women who have survived breast cancer (Bre ´dart, Swaine Verdier
and Dolbeault, 2007).
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way. Up to a certain extent, it is understandable that the questions are phrased in this
way; debrieﬁng interviews have made clear that most patients normally do not
describe themselves in terms like ‘feeling sexually attractive’ [27, p. 191]. This
might be true, yet the restriction to negative phrased questions precludes a fully
ﬂedged account of body experiences, since it forces informants to negative
formulations only. What does it mean if a woman replies ‘not at all’ to the question
‘do you ﬁnd it difﬁcult to look at yourself naked?’ Of course, it means that she has
no difﬁculty with her own appearance. But this reply gives no information about the
possibility of this woman being content (or perhaps surprised or fascinated) while
looking at herself. The negative phrasing prevents the possibility of expressing a
positive experience. Conversely, a negative reply to a positive phrased question
does not simply correspond with a genuine negative experience. Consequently, a
body image scale which is limited to either negative or positive phrasings does not
adequately assess the wide range of possible body experiences. If one really aims at
gaining insight into the experience of changes of appearance in cancer survivors, it
is advisable to complement quantitative questionnaires with some open question.
My second objection with this efﬁcient and concise body image scale – however
useful it may be for a quick examination – involves another difﬁculty in wording.
As explained above ‘body image’ is not the same as the physical body, rather it
implies a relation to it; it comprises the way one experiences and values one’s body.
If we look at item (8) from the BIS, for instance, we see that it is rather difﬁcult to
take into account clearly the relation between physical self and the experience of
this physical self in such a brieﬂy formulated question. The issue is about the feeling
of bodily wholeness: ‘Have you been feeling the treatment has left your body less
whole?’ One can imagine that respondents might have difﬁculties in understanding
what exactly the examiner wants to know. Given the fact that most of the questioned
population literally has lost a body part this item may seem redundant. However,
this item is not about physical loss in itself. It rather interrogates how a physical
defect is experienced. As such it gives the respondents the possibility to express
their own feeling of loss. Not everybody experiences the loss of a body part in the
same way, and it is even possible to retain one’s feeling of wholeness after a
mastectomy. The emphasis should thus be put upon ‘feeling’. It is questionable,
however, whether the relation and distinction between one’s physical loss and one’s
feelings about it are adequately formulated here.
These problems in formulation are brought out even clearer if we look at the
French translation of this item: ‘Avez vous ressenti le traitement comme une atteinte
a ` votre corps ou une mutilation’ [7].
7 Literally translated back into English it reads
7 It is worth noticing that French researchers who translated the English Body Image Scale into French
had quite some difﬁculties with item 8. Provisionally they translated ‘have you been feeling the treatment
has left your body less whole?’ into ‘Avez-vous ressenti que le traitement avez affecte ´ votre inte ´grite ´
corporelle?’ This resulted in the English contra-translation ‘Did you feel that the treatment affected your
body integrity?’ It was noted, however, that the concept ‘bodily integrity’ was not comprehensible enough
since it involves an elevated style. Hence, the item was ﬁnally translated as ‘Avez vous ressenti le
traitement comme une atteinte a ` votre corps ou une mutilation’, which harmonizes with ordinary French
usage [7].
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Assuming that most breast surgery in actual fact results in a greater or lesser degree
of mutilation, this question is rather ambiguous. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that a
breast amputee will reply ‘not at all’ to this question. And yet, it is well possible that
these patients may experience their (amputated) body as whole. We thus need
another approach to make explicit the experience of wholeness (or lost wholeness)
in people who have to live with a body that from a biological perspective is no
longer whole.
From Body Image to Bodily Integrity
That body image does not simply coincide with one’s physical appearance is clear
in cases in which a person may have an extremely negative feeling or attitude
towards her or his body despite an unchanged or ‘‘non-deviant’’ physical
appearance. Such is the case in Body Dismorphic Disorder [39], Body Integrity
Identity Disorder [50], and some eating disorders. Since body image disturbances
in cancer survivors are caused by changes in one’s physical appearance, intactness
(and sometimes one’s competence), one might be tempted to believe that there is a
direct correlation between the degree of physical mutilation and the degree of body
image dissatisfaction. Indeed, if we look at various studies on body image and
breast cancer, we see that the tendency to ﬁnd correlations between physical
mutilation and negative body image is one that is inherent to the design of such
studies, e.g. studies that suggest that patients who received breast conservation
have a better body image than those who received a mastectomy [2, 19], or that
reconstructive surgery may restore a woman’s body image [1]. These studies
suggest a direct relation between body image and physical appearance and
intactness. I would like to stress here, once again, that body image does not simply
imply a coincidence with the physical body, i.e. neither with the body as a physical
object (appearance, biological intactness), nor with the body as an agent
(competence, functional intactness).
8 Body image involves the valuation of these
aspects of embodiment.
The incautious equation of physical self with its valuation is even more apparent
in medical practice. For physicians, who predominantly operate from a biomedical
perspective, it is almost taken for granted that the restoration of physical wholeness
results in a (more) positive valuation of one’s physical self. It is therefore not
surprising that some physicians even suggest that all women who have to undergo a
breast amputation, should be offered the option of a breast reconstruction if their
physical condition allows it [67].
8 By the same token, quality of life does not simply coincide with physical (dys)function or appearance.
It rather involves a person’s valuation of function and appearance. This implies that the restoration of
physical functions does not automatically result in an increased quality of life. It is unfortunate that in the
quality of life questionnaire for breast cancer survivors (BR-23), not all items reﬂect this aspect of
valuation. Item 34 (‘Have you lost any hair?’) and item 49 (‘Was it difﬁcult to raise your arm or to move
it sideways?’), for instance, only query appearance and function and not a person’s valuation of it [17].
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way one experiences and valuates it, I would like to emphasize here that the
restoration of physical wholeness does not automatically yield the experience of
bodily wholeness. Indeed, breast reconstruction does not always increase body
image satisfaction [25]. Sometimes women even experienced regret concerning
their choice for breast reconstruction, especially when they were not able to value
the physical restoration of their body in a positive way [46].
It is not my intention to trivialize the importance of a physical intact (female)
body. In that sense my view differs from radical feminist conceptions which
criticize the practice of breast reconstruction and insist that women should not allow
themselves to be seduced by the idea of bodily wholeness which is a construction of
male biology and medicine [35, 52]. Like the biomedical discourse, this feminist
discourse also implies a limited and one-sided normative claim. To facilitate good
decision making, and thus good care, one should suspend both these discourses to
concentrate ﬁrst of all on patients’ embodied experiences.
Since the ‘ﬁxing’ of damaged bodies does not always simply imply the
restoration of a patient’s positive valuation of her body [15], health care practices
that focus solely on normalizing interventions, such as a breast reconstruction, do
not always show respect for a patient’s bodily integrity. As a matter of fact, these
types of interventions, however benevolently intended, may even violate a patient’s
bodily integrity. To justify this view on how medical professionals should take care
of ‘damaged bodies’, I suggest that the phenomenon of body image—i.e. being
related to one’s physical self—presupposes a process of identiﬁcation, and that the
extent to which this process is successful is crucial for one’s bodily integrity.
No doubt, the notion of bodily integrity I would like to propose here differs
considerably from current normative conceptions in bioethics. Leaving aside the
details of various studies on bodily integrity in health practice, I believe that my
idea of integrity differs in at least two ways. First, in most current studies on bodily
integrity, the emphasis is placed on the question of whether it is morally desirable to
intrude, be it medically, cosmetically or ritually, upon an (intact) inviolable but
vulnerable body. For that reason, bodily integrity is mainly discussed in issues like
organ donation, circumcision, and self-determination in sexual reproduction. As far
as I know, it has never been an issue in the care and treatment of bodies that are no
longer intact, such as in oncology. Second, very often bodily integrity is understood
as a pre-conceived idea of wholeness, i.e. wholeness according to biology, or
wholeness according to a religious or moral system, or according to a certain
ideology. In contrast with this, I consider bodily integrity ﬁrst of all as an experience
of wholeness.
As I have explained in-depth elsewhere [51], the experience of bodily
wholeness, including its underlying process of identiﬁcation, can be understood
on the basis of a phenomenological understanding of embodiment. In that sense,
my view on bodily integrity is in accordance with Zeiler’s [68]. Drawing on
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, she maintains that not just any physical change will
threaten the integrity of the body-subject. Rather, a physical change affects one’s
integrity only if it perturbs one’s being and engaging in the world. I concur with
this Merleau-Pontian view, yet, I would like to add that one’s integrity may still be
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affected. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of the body concentrates on motor
intentionality and one’s functional engaging in the world—the embodied subject as
‘I can’ (je peux)[ 36]—and, accordingly, he analyzes (pathological) cases in which
this bodily potentiality is impaired. But he does not teach us much about changes
in physical appearance that do not affect one’s physical functioning, but which
may nonetheless disrupt one’s experience of wholeness and integrity.
Instead of focusing on the phenomenological idea of ‘being bodily engaged in the
world’, I will concentrate here on the phenomenological analysis of bodily self-
experience. This experience is so typical since it is double-sided or, to phrase it
slightly differently, one can experience one’s own body according to two different
modes of experience: as an object (or Ko ¨rper) and as a subject (or Leib)[ 28]; or as
corps objectif and as corps propre or ve ´cu, a lived body which is one’s own [36]. It
is especially because of the Leib-experience that the experience of one’s own body
differs from the perception of other things or objects. The Leib-experience is a
localized lived-through experience of oneself, for instance, when in touching my left
hand I have the feeling that I am touched, that it is my body that is touched. It is
often claimed that contemporary medicine considers patients’ bodies exclusively as
objects, totally ignoring their Leib-experiences [31, 56]. As I see it, an experience of
wholeness or integrity implies that both experiences of one’s own body concur with
one another. What I call bodily identiﬁcation involves the relation between Leib and
Ko ¨rper experiences.
These two experiences of one’s own body could also be seen as the experience of
having (Ko ¨rper) and being (Leib) one’s body [48]. In the experience of having a
body, one is distanced form oneself and does not coincide with oneself [61]. In this
experience, one’s body is like a thing. It is especially through the sense of vision
that one can perceive oneself as a thing. Facing one’s mirror image one perceives
one’s own objectivized body, inspecting its various qualities. Normally, one
experiences this ‘thing’ nevertheless as one’s own because one identiﬁes with it. To
explain the process of identiﬁcation, it is useful to brieﬂy discuss the phenomenon
of one’s mirror image. Lacan [30] has argued that the recognition of one’s own
mirror image immediately implies a misrecognition (me ´connaissance) since the
image is not the same as oneself; it is an externalization or alienation of oneself.
Identiﬁcation through mirror recognition therefore does not simply mean X = X,
but rather X = Y: I am my mirror image though I do not totally coincide with it.
According to psychoanalysis, identiﬁcation not only indicates an equation of myself
and my image, but also involves assimilation into it; one desires to be like one’s
image. This latter aspects gains ascendency if we realize that one’s own mirror
image is directly related to one’s visibility for others.
9 Identiﬁcation through mirror
recognition, therefore, equally implies a desire to assimilate to dominant ideals in
one’s society and culture, to respond to the (normative) gaze of others. For that
reason, the process of self-identiﬁcation is not an isolated, individual psychological
process. In this paper, I will limit myself, nonetheless, to a discussion of
9 Or, as Merleau-Ponty [37] argues in his interpretation of the mirror stage: ‘‘the image in the mirror
prepares me for another still more serious alienation, which will be the alienation by others’’ (p. 36).
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argument.
10
Although visible and imaginary aspects are important in the process of
identiﬁcation, I prefer to describe this process more generally as the possibility of
being the body one has. I do so because not all experiences of one’s body as a thing
(or Ko ¨rper) are directly related to the sense of vision. A lame or sleeping limb, for
instance, is a clear Ko ¨rper experience in which no vision is involved. As previously
mentioned, in most cases in which one experiences one’s body (or parts of it) as
Ko ¨rper, one is nevertheless capable of identifying with it. Whereas the condition of
a sleeping limb may temporarily and slightly interrupt this process, other conditions,
such as paralysis and amputation, may disturb it in a more profound way. These
conditions are caused by the absence of so-called ‘‘localized sensations’’. These
sensations normally produce the experience of ‘‘mine-ness’’ and ‘‘here-ness’’ which
are typical for the Leib experience. The cancelation of this experience in these
conditions is due to neurological problems.
Whether one is able to be the body one has is, however, not only a neurological
question. Failures in identiﬁcation can equally imply psychological (or psychiatric)
problems. An extreme example of not being able to be the body one has is Body
Integrity Identity Disorder (BIID). This is a condition in which one experiences
one’s own limb as something that does not belong to one’s body and therefore has to
be removed. BIID patients are not able to be the body they have, and therefore they
cannot experience their body as a whole or an integrum [50]. Only after amputation
they regain an experience of wholeness. This extreme (psychiatric) example shows
painfully what happens if the process of bodily identiﬁcation fails. It is not for
nothing that it is called a disorder of one’s identity and integrity.
Negative feelings about one’s own body after disﬁguring breast cancer,
obviously, cannot be compared to this psychiatric disorder. I believe, however,
that breast cancer survivors can also have problems in identifying with their
modiﬁed body, though they clearly differ from identiﬁcation failure due to
neurological and/or psychiatric conditions. If breast cancer survivors fail to identify
positively with their modiﬁed body, they value their own body in a negative way. If,
conversely, they succeed in being the body they have, it implies that they are able to
experience and say: ‘This body I have, however changed (and mutilated) it is, is
me’. It is very unlikely that cancer survivors will express their embodied self-
experiences in this way. Experiences of wholeness—or discrepancy—come to light
most explicitly in certain feelings and emotions. Shame, for instance, involves a
certain degree of self-discrepancy [26]. If a breast cancer survivor is (extremely)
ashamed of her body, I would say that her experience of bodily integrity is affected.
10 It goes without saying that the way one valuates his or her scarred body, the degree to which one can
identify with it, is also dependent of social and cultural norms. Indeed, physical ‘deviances’ or ‘stigma’s’
only come into being in social relations [24]. Social (and cultural) interaction is thus constitutive for the
meaning of appearance in breast cancer survivors [58]. This paper, however, is not the place to dwell
upon the social and cultural aspects implied in body image and bodily integrity. My hypothesis that
bodily integrity involves a process of identiﬁcation on both a personal level and an intersubjective and
cultural level (and that these levels are interrelated), will be elaborated and researched in another study.
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especially to the latter’s affective dimension (although this can never be fully
separated from its cognitive and behavioral components). Indeed a negative body
image (i.e. a negative valuation of one’s physical appearance and one’s physical
intactness) refers to the lack of a positive identiﬁcation with one’s physical self and,
thus, to the loss of bodily integrity. I thus believe that the use of certain body image
items can contribute to the articulation of a person’s bodily integrity. In contrast with
the aim of most body image evaluation—the reinforcement of a patient’s psychic
well-being—I suggest that body experience evaluation should not be used for
psychological purposes only. Examining a patient’s experience of bodily integrity,
with the help of body image items, can have a practical and ethical purpose as well.
The ethical dimension of body experience valuation becomes clear if we look at
moral values that are implicated in the notion of bodily integrity. Stemming from the
Latin word integrum and the verb in-tangere, integrity signiﬁes both ‘wholeness’ and
‘not touching’ [43]. Taken together it thus refers to a wholeness that should not be
touched, not be hurt—a wholeness that should be respected. Applied to medical
practices, this means that a patient’s body should be treated with respect and
prudence. Medical professionals who necessarily have to intervene in a patient’s
body still have to respect as much as possible the integrum of this person’s body.
From a liberal stance, according to which a person owns his or her own body,
bodily integrity more or less converges with the principle of autonomy [69]; i.e. a
health professional may ‘intrude upon’ a patient’s body only if this patient has
consented to the intervention. In spite of this, respect for bodily integrity is not
exactly the same as respect for autonomy, because one’s body is never fully
possessed, nor something of which one has total disposal. No matter whether
patients have consented to certain interventions, respect for bodily integrity also
prescribes that medical professionals should not treat patients’ bodies as if they were
just objects or a collection of organs, tissues and limbs [32, 57, 68]. In this way,
bodily integrity is closely linked to human dignity and, to a lesser degree, to the
medical ethical principle of ‘nonmaleﬁcence’ [5]. In accordance with these
conceptions, violation of bodily integrity occurs in, for example, the commercial-
ization of human organs, disrespectful nursing and an amputation of the wrong limb.
Returning to the example of breast cancer, I would like to add something here
that enlarges the moral scope of bodily integrity, namely, that benevolent treatments
can also violate a person’s bodily integrity. Indeed, if a breast cancer survivor has
received a breast reconstruction which eventually turns out to make no contribution
at all to the restoration of her experience of bodily wholeness, the treatment has
been an unneeded (and irreversible) intrusion.
Body Experience Evaluation Prior to Intervention
Thus far, I have argued that medically successful treatments, even if they have been
performed with prudence and professional discretion after patients have consented
to it, still may result in the violation of a person’s bodily integrity. One could object
here that it is not fair to judge treatments with the beneﬁt of hindsight, and that if a
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s/he probably would not have performed it. This is true. It is not at all my intention,
however, to express disapproval of medical practices such as breast reconstruction.
My, perhaps extreme, view on bodily integrity should rather be seen as an invitation
to support oncology care practices given that the evaluation of bodily wholeness
could, I believe, be employed in assessment prior to interventions.
Body experience evaluation, which aims at the articulation of a patient’s actual
experience of bodily wholeness, can help patients (who have to decide about an
intervention that will change their body) to weigh up their situation more clearly.
Deliberately considering their own embodied experiences (with the help of the
professionals involved), may enable patients to gain a more complete idea of the
impact of various interventions. As such it can also be seen as making an important
contribution in helping those involved arrive at a more informed decision.
One may again raise an objection here: how could the evaluation of a person’s
body experience prior to intervention envisage how this person will valuate her or
his body after the intervention? Of course, one can never fully foresee how a change
in physical appearance and intactness will be experienced but this, in itself, does not
leave the suggestion I am making here—that explicit awareness of the way one
actually values one’s body may be useful in weighing up different alternatives—any
less compelling. I ﬁnd this so mainly because the valuation of one’s body—one’s
body image—is not something isolated. Rather, it is directly related to what is
valuable and meaningful for this person in his or her life. A person’s long-term body
image, which does not necessarily stay the same all the time [62], parallels a
person’s life story. Body experience evaluation which aims at envisaging the impact
of future interventions should thus take place against the background of a patient’s
narrative.
Endorsing the hermeneutical idea that experiences express themselves in stories
[44, 65], I maintain that the interpretation of lived experience necessarily involves
an interpretation of stories. The narrative stance naturally complements the
phenomenological one. Also, the narrative approach can take into account the
temporal aspect of the way one experiences one’s own body. This temporal and
narrative aspect of body image is hard, if not impossible, to frame in a quantitative
evaluation tool. Indeed, measuring a speciﬁc bodily experience at a certain point in
time does not provide much information about how valuation of one’s body is
formed over time. Body image is not an instant experience of one’s body, and this is
the reason that the actual valuation of one’s body is not detached from a person’s
future. Given this, it is not totally impossible to estimate, on the basis of actual body
experience valuation, how someone will eventually valuate a certain change in
physical appearance, intactness and competence.
It is too naı ¨ve to maintain that a story or narrative is a simple representation of
one’s experiences. The way one experiences one’s body—one’s body image—is not
always completely transparent and conscious for one self [23]. Expressing one’s
body experiences thus already implies a process of self-interpretation. In this sense,
the telling of a story is not only about what was experienced, but equally about
‘what becomes experience in the telling and its reception’ [22]. In this process of
interpretation and story telling, health care professionals can play an important role.
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not only listen to stories, but also help to build them while interpreting them. This is
especially so in stressful situations, such as the fearful period after having being
diagnosed with a (life-threatening) cancer and during which one has to make far-
reaching decisions in a short space of time. Here patients may have totally lost track,
and may have great difﬁculties in articulating how they experience and value their
own body.
Following Frank’s [22] distinction between ‘restitution’, ‘chaos’ and ‘quest’
narratives, I believe that aspects of quest narratives will be especially helpful here.
Quest narratives are not about triumphing over one’s illness (restitution narrative),
nor simply about being sucked into one’s illness (chaos). In a quest narrative, the
narrator is constantly searching for a way to deal with his or her condition. The
quest narrative is indeed the story of the patient who is telling the story and not just
about remedy (restitution narrative) or suffering in which the teller has lost his or
her voice. A quest narrative, remaining open and never ending—let alone happily—
‘‘affords the ill person a voice as teller of her own story’’ [22].
Obviously, counseling prior to interventions is not the place to build extensive life
stories. The only thing I would like to suggest here is that counseling could also
include a short but joint orientation of what is important for a patient in his or her life
with a special focus on how this patient values his or her physical appearance and
intactness.
11 Needless to say, to develop (and implement) this type of assessment,
further research is required. To increase health care professionals’ sensitivity to the
impact of body experience in health care practice, and to provide them with some
practical aids to thematize this experience, it should ﬁrst of all be examined how
patients, both before and after treatment, put into words their experience of (loss of)
bodilywholeness.Thesespeciﬁcexpressions canserveasabasisforprospectivejoint
narrative work and can support health care professionals to initiate the process of
jointlyconstructingthepatient’s‘bodystory’.Futureresearch,therefore,needstoaim
at the development of a rich, yet workable, vocabulary of patients’ body experiences.
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